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Abstract 
Agri-environmental schemes (AES) target at improving environmental status of cultivated land 
by remunerating farmers willing to commit to higher environmental standards. Thus far, no 
consensus exists whether AES incentivize adoption of pro-environmental production or simply 
offer windfall profits for those already operating at lower intensities. Using farm-level data, 
evaluation typically rests on comparing farms with and without AES. For differencing out 
unobservables that drive farmers into AES participation and therefore confound impact 
measurement, DID-matching methods are widespread, yet critical reflection remains sparse. 
We target at closing this gap by shedding light on the implicit assumptions about cause and 
effect paths linking participation and treatment outcome. We discuss challenges for 
identification of causal effects in presence of unobservable confounders over a broad range of 
methods and illustrate DID methods to estimate AES effects on land-use in West Germany. 
Keywords:  policy impact evaluation, agri-environmental schemes, DID-matching, 
kernel matching 
JEL codes:  Q18, Q24 , Q58, D04 
Acknowledgements 
The data used in this study was made available within the EU’s 7th Research Framework 
Programme as part of the project “Factor Markets” Grant agreement N°: 245123-FP7-KBBE-
2009-3. 
                                                          
1
  Production Economics Group, University of Bonn, Meckenheimer Allee 174, 53115 Bonn, Germany 
* Corresponding author: r.uehleke@ilr.uni-bonn.de  
2
  Professorship for Agricultural, Food and Environmental Policy, Justus-Liebig-Universität Gießen, Sencken-
bergerstrasse 3, D-35390 Gießen, Germany  
ii Reinhard Uehleke, Martin Petrick and Silke Hüttel 
SiAg-Working Paper 21 (2019); HU Berlin 
Table of contents 
Abstract ....................................................................................................................................... i 
1  Introduction ........................................................................................................................... 1 
2  Evaluation of agri-environmental policy within the EU’s CAP ............................................ 3 
3  Effects of interest, potential impact pathways and identification .......................................... 5 
3.1  The causal model and effects of interest ........................................................................ 5 
3.2  Selection, impact pathways and identification strategies ............................................... 6 
4 Techniques for identification strategies ................................................................................. 8 
4.1 Matching ......................................................................................................................... 8 
4.2 Differences-in-differences ............................................................................................ 10 
4.3 DID-Matching .............................................................................................................. 12 
5 Illustration: Evaluating AES in Germany ............................................................................ 14 
5.1 Data, sample and AES participation ............................................................................. 14 
5.2  Average treatment effects of AES participation ........................................................... 18 
5.3 Average treatment effects of AES participation by farm types .................................... 22 
6  Discussion, future research and policy implications ........................................................... 24 
References ................................................................................................................................ 25 
Appendix .................................................................................................................................. 30 
List of tables 
Table I:  Means of farm characteristics by treatment state and cohort ................................ 16 
Table II:  Coefficients of logit model for AES uptake by participation cohort .................... 17 
Table III: DID-matching outcomes for fertilizer expenditures ............................................. 19 
Table IV:  DID-matching outcomes for fertilizer expenditures, reduced imbalance ............. 22 
Table V:  DID-matching outcomes for livestock farms ........................................................ 23 
Table AI: AES uptake by year in West German .................................................................... 30 
List of figures 
Figure 1: Possible cause-and-effect paths ............................................................................... 7 
Figure 2: Matching, conditioning on S (a) and X and Y2 (b) .................................................. 9 
Figure 3:  Average treatment effect from DID ...................................................................... 12 
Figure 4:  DID-Matching (a) and DID-Matching on the pre-treatment outcome (b) ............ 13 
Figure 5: Covariate balance before and after matching (outcome fertilizer expenditure) .... 20 
Figure 6: Improved covariate balance (added exact matching on share of rented land) ...... 21 
Figure A1:  Covariate balance for outcome grassland share .................................................... 31 
Figure A2:  Covariate balance for livestock farms ................................................................... 32 
 Agricultural policy evaluation with large-scale observational farm data 1 
SiAg-Working Paper 21 (2019); HU Berlin 
1  Introduction 
Agri-environmental schemes (AES) together with the 2013 introduced ecological focus areas 
are the most important policy instruments for the improvement of sustainable agricultural 
practices within the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). While both measures are on 
voluntary base, ecological focus areas offer farms higher payments for additional efforts in 
more sustainable land use, for instance extensively managed buffer strips. Within AES  
– mandatory in the rural development plans of the EU Member states since 1992 – farmers 
commit to produce at higher ecological standards such as extensive crop production for five 
years contract periods. In return, farms receive compensation payments for higher production 
cost and potential yield losses.  
Despite the availability of a large variety of quasi-experimental methods for causal impact 
evaluation (Imbens & Rubin, 2015), empirical evidence on AES contribution to environment 
states of cultivated land is limited (Yoder, Ward, Dalrymple, Spak, & Lave, 2019). Only few 
studies tempt to evaluate agri-environmental policy based on causal impact estimators, although 
the necessary large-scale farm-level data sets such as the Farm Accountancy Data Network 
(FADN) offer a strong base. Consensus persists on the core challenge for causal impact 
analysis: the non-experimental conditions and data unavailability on farmers preferences 
(D’Alberto, Zavalloni, Raggi, & Viaggi, 2018). Since AES adoption is voluntary, and driven 
by environmental preferences and pro-environmental behavior of the manager, such 
unobservable characteristics can confound identification of causal effects. In presence of this 
selection bias, a direct comparison of participating with non-participating farms will not 
represent the true causal impact of the policy. Hence, relying on existing large-scale data sets, 
the central question is how to overcome this selection bias. 
To address the selection bias, several quasi-experimental methods exist: by ensuring 
comparability of farms and accounting for self-selectivity issues, these methods offer estimates 
that can be interpreted as unbiased causal effects of AES participation on the environmental 
state of the farmed land. Typically, based on a set of farm characteristics, compared farms differ 
then only in their participation state. Remaining differences in the outcome of interest such as 
land use intensity can then be traced back to AES participation. Many of these farm 
characteristics are, however, unobserved or are genuinely unobservable. Exploiting the 
advantage of panel data, available estimation techniques difference out potentially confounding 
unobservables by difference-in-difference (DID) estimators combined with matching 
(Heckman, Ichimura, & Todd, 1997). 
Identification of these causal effects, however, relies on specific assumptions about how the set 
of farm characteristics is related to the participation decision and outcome (Elwert & Winship, 
2014). First, unbiased estimation based on DID-matching requires that the unobserved 
characteristics (e.g., environmental preferences) have a time invariant effect on the outcome. 
Second, conditional on a set of observable characteristics parallel outcome trends must exist. 
The latter assumption implies that participating farms with similar characteristics would have 
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experienced the same outcome trend as those farms in the control group in the absence of the 
policy. Robustness and validity of results hence strongly depend on whether these assumptions 
can be justified. A profound justification, in turn, requires an explicit representation of impact 
pathways (e.g. Petrick & Zier, 2011, for agricultural policy). Thus far, the impact pathways 
implicitly assumed by the chosen method are rarely made explicit in agricultural policy 
evaluation. This hinders discussion about generalizability of the results and bears danger of 
potentially biased estimations of the causal effect.  
Against this backdrop, we target at investigating two major questions of agricultural policy 
evaluation: (i) how to deal with self-selection in the econometric model specification to estimate 
AES effects and (ii) how to use existing large-scale data such as the FADN effectively by 
addressing self-selection in the analysis and retrieve reliable policy outcome measures. To this 
end, we clarify how existing quasi-experimental evaluation methods perform under different 
impact pathways and illustrate potential biases that arise from deviations of the assumed impact 
pathway. Then, based on the theoretical representation of the cause and effect paths, we 
illustrate DID-estimators for evaluating AES for Germany in the period 2000-2006. We 
compare several DID-matching estimators using a range of available algorithms including 
kernel matching with optimal bandwidth selection procedures (Galdo, Smith, & Black, 2008; 
Huber, Lechner, & Steinmayr, 2015; Loader, 1999) and post-matching regression adjustment 
(Abadie & Imbens, 2006, 2011). We find that the kernel methods perform better in terms of 
efficiency and bias reduction than nearest neighbor estimators.  
Thus, our study offers four contributions. First, we provide an updated review of the literature 
showing that available results on AES effects are ambiguous and partial at best. Second  we are 
offering an explicit theoretical framework of the cause and effect paths of AES participation 
using path diagrams (Pearl, 1995). These serve as a basis for discussing the assumptions of 
different quasi-experimental methods in the context of agricultural policy evaluation and enable 
us to identify knowledge gaps about adoption behavior to be potentially addressed within future 
studies on AES adoption. Third, using FADN data for West Germany, we find that participation 
has led to notable increases in farms’ grassland share and reduction in fertilizer intensity in the 
first program period, 2000-2006. Based on a unique farm type specific analysis, we find 
environmental effects for specialized livestock farms only. Fourth, in doing so, we present a 
data strategy that uses available large-scale data efficiently without additional experimental cost 
for evaluation purposes. Our results further reveal need to incorporate more meaningful 
outcome measures to be addressed in future design of monitoring of the CAP. As such, our 
illustration serves as an instructive case study for AES evaluation and can easily be transferred 
to other European countries and programming periods in order to enhance understanding of the 
impact of agri-environmental measures.  
We start by reviewing the literature and discuss potential sources of biases (section 2). In 
section 3, we structure underlying assumptions of different identification strategies and discuss 
consequences of possible derivations from the theorized causal relationships by using path 
diagrams. We then discuss empirical strategies for identification based on these cause- and 
effect graphs: matching, DID and DID-matching (section 4). Then we illustrate the application 
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of DID-matching to evaluate AES participation in Germany (section 5). Finally, we discuss a 
future research agenda for experimental studies and policy implications in section 6.  
2 Evaluation of agri-environmental policy within the EU’s CAP 
Evaluations of the causal impacts of pro agri-environmental agricultural practices are scarce as 
pointed out by Börner et al. (2017) and Yoder et al. (2019), who find in their extensive literature 
review 18 studies that quantify environmental outcomes of conservation practices adoption. For 
the specific environmental measures within the CAP, evaluation reports mainly rest on simple 
before and after comparisons of farms that are deemed comparable at the same point in time 
after the policy implementation (e.g. Hart, Mottershead, Tucker, Underwood, & Maréchal, 
2017). However, in case of non-random participation decisions, participating farms differ from 
non-participating farms in core characteristics that are either important for the outcome of 
interest, such as the farms’ production intensity, or for the participation decision, such as 
environmental preferences (Bartkowski & Bartke, 2018; Lastra-Bravo, Hubbard, Garrod, & 
Tolón-Becerra, 2015; Pascucci, de-Magistris, Dries, Adinolfi, & Capitanio, 2013; Zimmermann 
& Britz, 2016). For example, farms could participate in AES simply because they already 
operate at low intensities and therefore program requirements represent a low hanging fruit with 
remuneration (Defrancesco, Gatto, Runge, & Trestini, 2008). If low intensity farms self-select 
into the AES, a direct comparison between the outcomes of participating and non-participating 
farms would suggest an impact of the program on farming practices, whereas the difference 
simply could have been caused by the lower pre-participation intensities. Such potential 
situations challenge causal interpretation of effects since the payments for AES participation 
would merely generate windfall profits without any additional environmental effects (Chabé-
Ferret & Subervie, 2013; Hynes & Garvey, 2009). 
To our knowledge, only few studies tempt to estimate causal impacts of AES participation on 
the environment using quasi-experimental approaches: Arata and Sckokai (2016) for 5 selected 
EU member states, Chabé-Ferret and Subervie (2013) for France and Pufahl and Weiss (2009) 
for Germany. Other policy outcomes that have been examined are farm income (Udagawa, 
Hodge, & Reader, 2014) or farm productivity (Mennig & Sauer, 2019) or the environmental 
outcomes of organic farming (Cisilino, Bodini, & Zanoli, 2019). Among these only Chabé-
Ferret and Subervie (2013) critically reflect selection bias and identification assumptions for 
the causal effect. Based on empirical tests and a detailed robustness analysis, these authors 
provide an assessment framework for France, which however, cannot easily be transferred 
given the limitations of other countries’ data structure and availability.  
Regarding our illustration region of West Germany, the environmental impact of AES has been 
evaluated using DID-matching by Pufahl and Weiss (2009) and Arata and Sckokai (2016), 
though with differing results. Pufahl and Weiss use a dataset that comprises a rich set of farms` 
bookkeeping data for the period 2000-2005 to evaluate the effects of AES participation on a 
number of outcomes, including grassland share and expenditures for pesticides and fertilizer. 
Based on their DID-Matching approach, they find an average treatment effect of the treated 
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(ATT) of reduction in fertilizer expenditure of 9.4% and 4.7% reduction in pesticide 
expenditure. Moreover, they find a positive causal effect of AES participation on farm’s share 
of grassland of about 9%. They conclude that AES participation leads to the desired 
environmental effects of these programs. Arata and Sckokai (2016) use the European Farm 
Accountancy Data Network (FADN) to construct a balanced panel for the period of 2003 to 
2006 and compare the outcomes over five EU-countries. For Germany, they find an ATT in 
fertilizer expenditure reduction of € 33/ha but only for a subsample in which the share of AES-
payments on farm income is larger than 5%. They translate this reduction into a percentage 
reduction of 89%. In contrast to Pufahl and Weiss, Arata and Sckokai (2016) do not find 
significant effects of participation on pesticide expenditures and share of grassland. .  
The reasons for the different outcomes in these studies can be manifold: Arata and Sckokai 
employ a small dataset for Germany (those that adopt AES in 2003), which restricts 
generalizability of their result. Pufahl and Weiss (2009) dispose of a much larger sample of 
treated farms; however, they have to exclude about 80% of treated farms in order to reduce 
covariate bias to acceptable terms. Moreover, northern German farms are overrepresented in 
their dataset.  
Within our approach, we target at shedding light on the sensitivity of results to post matching 
covariate bias and on maximizing the matched pairs from the FADN sample of the whole 
implementation period 2000-2006. This way we ensure that results are representative, even 
allowing for separating impact effects across farm types. Using the EU FADN database, 
however, limits the choice of outcome measures. The majority of the aforementioned studies 
refer to input intensity of fertilizer and plant protection on cost basis and grassland share, since 
these represent implicitly environmental indicators simply because less input per land unit 
would do less harm to the environment. Some EU member states already collect data on 
environmental performance of the agricultural sector and several studies try to use national farm 
accountancy datasets to assess farm sustainability on different dimensions (Dabkienė, 2016; 
Kelly et al., 2018). For example Buckley, Wall, Moran, and Murphy (2015) derive farm gate 
balances of N and P from the Irish National Farm Survey. These farm gate nutrient-balances 
offer more detailed information on the environmental performance than fertilizer inputs on 
expenditure base. Additionally, recent studies combine farm accountancy data with routinely 
collected information from the Integrated Administration and Control System (IACS) and Land 
Parcel Information System (LPIS), but also with survey data (e.g. Leonhardt, Penker, & 
Salhofer, 2019) or with detailed information about scheme participation (Mennig & Sauer, 
2019). Even combinations with large-scale data sets based on remote sensing and geospatial 
technologies have been proposed (e.g. Lynch, Donnellan, Finn, Dillon, & Ryan, 2019).  
These examples show that combining routinely collected large-scale datasets offer promising 
possibilities to construct better outcome measures from ecological indicators. While these 
improved measures would be valuable, they do not solve the problem of confounding in the 
causal analysis nor the efficient use available data. Since one of our aims is to illustrate how 
available data can be employed more effectively for the purpose of agri-environmental policy 
evaluation, we focus on measures that are available within the FADN. By doing this, we deliver 
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insights about the usefulness of combining these large-scale bookkeeping datasets with more 
meaningful environmental indicators.   
3  Effects of interest, potential impact pathways and identification 
3.1  The causal model and effects of interest  
We are interested in the causal effect of AES participation on an outcome of interest. For 
illustration, we refer to the potential outcome model (Rubin, 1974). Each farm has a potential 
outcome under each treatment state, that is, AES participation and non-participation. The 
individual causal effect is defined as the difference in the individual potential outcomes  
𝛿𝑖 = 𝑦𝑖
1 − 𝑦𝑖
0, 
with 𝑦𝑖
1 denoting the potential outcome of farm i if it belonged to the treated group and 𝑦𝑖
0 
denoting the potential outcome of farm i if it belonged to the control group. This individual 
treatment effect is unknown, as only one of these two states is observable.  
To get an estimate of the average treatment effect, the individual potential outcomes are treated 
as realizations of population-level potential outcome random variables 𝑌1and 𝑌0  (Ho, Imai, 
King, & Stuart, 2007). For multiple observations, the average treatment effect (ATE) is defined 
as  
𝐴𝑇𝐸 =
1
𝑁
∑ 𝑦𝑖
1 − 𝑦𝑖
0𝑁
𝑖=1 = 𝐸[𝑌
1 − 𝑌0] = 𝐸[𝑌1 ] − 𝐸[𝑌0],  (1) 
where realized outcomes are observed under the treatment assignment mechanism 𝐷 ∈ {0,1} 
such that 𝐸[𝑌1 |𝐷 = 1] and 𝐸[𝑌0|𝐷 = 0].  
In the context of evaluating AES, the causal effect of interest is the average treatment effect of 
the treated (ATT), that is, how did AES contribute to increase the environmental indicator of 
those who participated. The ATT is defined as the difference between the observed outcome of 
the treated farms and the potential outcome of these farms if they had not participated in AES.  
𝐴𝑇𝑇 = 𝐸[𝑌1 − 𝑌0|𝐷 = 1] = 𝐸[𝑌1 |𝐷 = 1] − 𝐸[𝑌0|𝐷 = 1]  (2)  
If those in the in the treatment group performed, on average, no better or worse in their 
counterfactual control state compared to those in the control group, the unobservable potential 
outcome of the treatment group 𝐸[𝑌0|𝐷 = 1] can be substituted by the observed outcome of 
the control group 𝐸[𝑌0|𝐷 = 0]: 
𝐸[𝑌0|𝐷 = 1] = 𝐸[𝑌0|𝐷 = 0].  (3) 
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Eq. (3) states the sufficient condition for identifying the average treatment effect of the treated. 
This condition allows estimating the causal effect as a contrast between observed means of the 
treatment and control groups (Athey & Imbens, 2017a; Holland, Glymour, & Granger, 1985):  
𝐴𝑇𝑇 = 𝐸[𝑌1 |𝐷 = 1] − 𝐸[𝑌0|𝐷 = 0] = 𝐸[𝑌1] − 𝐸[𝑌0]. (4) 
In case of randomization 𝑌1  and 𝑌0  are probabilistically independent of D and the condition 
for causal effect estimation as given in eq. (3) is satisfied.  
In case of AES, condition (4) may be violated as farmers self-select into the agri-environmental 
program for instance based on preferences or low adjustment cost of the farm program after 
commitment to AES. If the independence of treatment assumption (eq. (3)) is violated, ATT 
will be biased from substituting 𝐸[𝑌0|𝐷 = 0] for 𝐸[𝑌0|𝐷 = 1] because [𝑌0|𝐷 = 1] ≠ 
𝐸[𝑌0|𝐷 = 0],  Several identification strategies exist on how the unobserved potential outcome 
can best be estimated (Angrist 1999), which we discuss next. 
3.2  Selection, impact pathways and identification strategies 
Identification strategies can be structured based on the presumed selection mechanism, that is, 
the uptake of pro-environmental farming under AES. We distinguish between three situations: 
i) selection on observables, e.g. matching techniques; ii) selection on unobservables, e.g. 
differences-in-differences (DID) approaches; iii) a mixture of both, e.g. DID-matching, which 
has been applied by most scientific AES evaluation studies. In what follows, we illustrate 
potential cause and effect paths and these strategies using directed acyclic graphs (Elwert 
& Winship, 2014).  
In Figure 1 we present possible cause and effect paths, all of which imply different empirical 
strategies for causal analysis. Variable D represents participation, which occurs in period 2. Y2 
and Y3 are the pre- and post-treatment outcomes, in our case the level of environmental 
performance. A set of observable characteristics, summarized in matrix X, such as the 
production portfolio, intensity and farm type. The average causal effects of AES participation 
(eqs. (1) and (2))  are identified when all non-causal paths between D and Y3 are blocked by 
conditioning on a suitable set of observed variables (Pearl, 2000). As such, AES participation 
could be determined solely by how easy the program requirements can be fulfilled. This would 
be reflected in the pre-participation production program by e.g. capital intensity, crop rotation 
or livestock density included in the vector X (cf. Figure 1a). These observed characteristics then 
determine the treatment decision but also the pre-treatment outcome. The non-causal paths 
between D and Y3 in Figure 1a are D←X→Y3 and D←X→Y2→Y3. Conditioning on X blocks 
both backdoor paths and the causal effect is identified.  
Alternatively, participation could additionally be determined by unobserved environmental 
preferences, E. An unobserved environmental preference leads to a better environmental 
performance before treatment for farms with otherwise similar characteristics (cf. Figure 1b). 
Two new backdoor paths arise: D← E →Y2 →Y3 and D← E →Y2 ←X→Y3. The first path is 
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blocked by conditioning on the pre-treatment outcome Y2. In the second path Y2 is a collider 
variable that causes a spurious correlation between its two common causes E and X (e.g., Elwert 
& Winship, 2014). Conditioning on X and Y2 blocks all backdoor paths in this situation. If now 
environmental preferences lead to better environmental performance before treatment and 
additionally this better performance makes program participation more attractive (above the 
effect of production intensity and production program captured in X) as illustrated in Figure 1, 
model c), then a new backdoor path arises, but it will be blocked by conditioning on Y2. Thus 
conditioning on X and Y2 is consistent for causal models a) through c).  
Figure 1: Possible cause-and-effect paths 
 
 
 
X3 
Y2 
Y3 D 
X2 E 
 
 
 
Y2 
Y3 D 
X E 
 
 
 
 
Y2 
Y3 D 
X E 
 a)                                                         b)                                                         c)                                                         
 
 
 
 
 d)           e) 
 
 
 
 
Notes: a) selection on observables b) selection on unobservables (time constant) c) selection on unobservables 
(time constant) and on the pre-treatment outcome d) selection on unobservables (time constant and time variant) 
and on the pre-treatment outcome e) separate effect of unobservables on farm characteristics with post-treatment 
characteristics as mediating factor between treatment and outcome  
 
Yet another possibility is that the unobserved time invariant effect of E on Y2 might also affect 
the post-treatment outcome Y3 separately, which would result in an unblocked path D← E →Y3 
as illustrated in Figure 1d. This is the case if unobserved pre-treatment characteristics are 
associated with the dynamics of the outcome variable but unbalanced between the treated and 
the untreated (Abadie, 2005). For example if farmers with strong (unobserved) environmental 
preferences already operate at low intensity levels for harmful inputs, for instance by choice of 
crops and plant protection (fixed effect), and because of these preferences these farms are likely 
to adjust the production such as to reduce the harmful environmental outcome over time (before 
treatment). Participation in AES and outcome after treatment will both be affected by the 
adjustment rate over time driven by preferences and ability. The unobserved environmental 
preferences could lead to a composed effect consisting of a time invariant and time variant 
component. Conditioning on the pre-treatment outcome would control for the time invariant 
part only and estimated treatment effects would be biased upwards.  
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Figure 1e explicitly depicts that the treatment effect of D on Y3 is induced by a change in the 
land use practices that are reflected in the farm characteristics in the post-treatment period X3. 
If environmental preferences have a separate effect on the post-treatment farmland 
management, which in turn affects the outcome, we must exclude this influence from the 
treatment effect. This is because this part of the change is not induced by the treatment, but 
would have occurred also without the treatment, yet only for those with pro-environmental 
preferences. Hence, the backdoor-path D←E →X3→Y3 cannot be blocked as E is unobservable 
and conditioning on X3 would lead to overcontrol bias (Elwert & Winship, 2014) as the 
participation state affects part of the change in X3.  
Additionally, other sets of unobservable characteristics might also determine treatment 
selection and outcome analogous to e). This may include the propensity to adopt new 
technologies or prior adoption of pro-environmental management practices such as sustainable 
intensification strategies (Weltin et al., 2018). Prior experience with sustainable intensification 
(SI) strategies might also influence the decision to adopt AES as well as the environmental 
outcome. As the FADN does not contain a measure for this prior experience, the influence on 
the outcome of these SI strategies will be ascribed to the effect of AES, leading to an 
overestimation of the AES impact.   
4 Techniques for identification strategies 
The portfolio of available methods for estimation the causal effect under different potential 
sources of bias is large (Imbens & Rubin, 2015). We illustrate the core concepts of the most 
popular techniques for conditioning on the identified confounding characteristics, namely 
matching, difference-in-difference (DID) and DID-matching in the following. 
4.1 Matching 
Matching identifies the ATT under the assumptions of ignorable treatment assignment, overlap 
and stable unit treatment value (Imbens, 2004; Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1983; Rubin, 1980). 
Ignorability states that the potential outcomes are independent of treatment status given a vector 
of pre-treatment covariates S,  
(𝑌0, 𝑌1) ⫫ 𝐷|𝑺. 
If ignorability is valid, it implies the following assumptions: 
Assumption 1: 𝐸(𝑌1 |𝐷 = 1, 𝑺) = 𝐸(𝑌1 |𝐷 = 0, 𝑺),  
Assumption 2: 𝐸(𝑌0|𝐷 = 1, 𝑺) = 𝐸(𝑌0|𝐷 = 0, 𝑺),  
which means that if the treated were untreated, they would have realized the same expected 
outcome (on average) as the untreated and vice versa. Under these assumptions, substituting 
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the unobserved potential outcome of the treated with the observed outcome of the control group 
(assumption 2) identifies the ATT:  
𝐴𝑇𝑇 = 𝐴𝑇𝑇𝑀 = 𝐸(𝑌1 − 𝑌0|𝐷 = 1, 𝑺) 
= 𝐸(𝑌1 |𝐷 = 1, 𝑺) − 𝐸(𝑌0|𝐷 = 1, 𝑺) 
= 𝐸(𝑌1 |𝐷 = 1, 𝑺) − 𝐸(𝑌0|𝐷 = 0, 𝑺) 
To ensure ignorability, all covariates that are related to the participation decision and the 
outcome must be included in S (Athey & Imbens, 2017b; Stuart, 2010; VanderWeele & 
Shpitser, 2011).  
This situation is illustrated in Figure 2. There are three points in time and treatment assignment 
occurs in 𝒕 = 𝟎. The outcome Y is an environmentally harmful output – i.e. the higher Y, the 
less environmentally sustainable is the production. Four outcome trends arise: for the treated 
(dark solid), the untreated (grey solid), the matched controls (dashed) and the potential outcome 
for the treated (dotted). If balancing on S satisfies ignorability, the potential outcome trend of 
the treated coincides with the observed outcome of the matched control trend and 𝑨𝑻?̂?𝑴 is 
consistent (Figure 2a). In this case, cross-sectional data would be sufficient to identify the causal 
effect. However, if instead of S only a subset, X, is observed, e.g. if an unobserved fixed effect 
like environmental preferences determines treatment and outcome, conditioning on X fails to 
ensure ignorability. If we assume a cause and effect path as in Figure 1b) or c), we can block 
the influence of E by matching on X and the pre-treatment outcome Y2, stating that (𝒀𝟎, 𝒀𝟏) ⫫
𝑫|𝑿, 𝒀𝟐, including (𝒀𝟎, 𝒀𝟏) ⫫ 𝑬|𝑿, 𝒀𝟐. This equals to stating that differences in Y3 of farms 
with the same levels of X and Y2 are strictly related to the treatment status and not caused by 
unobserved manager preferences. This requires full balance on Y2 in the matched sample.  
Figure 2: Matching, conditioning on S (a) and X and Y2 (b)  
a)               b)  
 
𝐴𝑇?̂?𝑀  
𝐴𝑇𝑇 𝐴𝑇?̂?𝑀  
  
If however environmental preferences have a separate effect on the post-treatment farm 
management and the corresponding farm characteristics as for the situation described in Figure 
1d) or 1e), the outcome trend of the matched control farms could differ from the potential 
outcome trend of the treated. For example, although being similar in X and Y2 the controls 
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could lack an interest in adapting new land management practices to further reduce 
environmental harm. This would cause the outcome trend of the matched controls to be flatter 
than the potential outcome path, resulting in an overestimation of the impact of AES 
participation (𝑨𝑻?̂?𝑴 in Figure 2b).  
𝐴𝑇𝑇𝑀 can be estimated with the sample equivalents of the expectancy values:  
𝐴𝑇?̂?M =
1
𝑁1
∑ ?̂?1(𝑺𝑖)
𝑁1
𝑖=1
− ?̂?0(𝑺𝑖) 
with ?̂?1(𝑺) and ?̂?0(𝑺) as estimators for the group specific expectancy values 𝐸(𝑌|𝐷 = 1, 𝑺) 
and 𝐸(𝑌|𝐷 = 0, 𝑺). 𝐴𝑇?̂?𝑀 sets ?̂?1(𝑺) to the observed value 𝑌𝑖
1 and ?̂?0(𝑺) to ?̃?𝑖
0, which is 
imputed from 𝑌𝑖
0 through a distance function that is based on the vector S (Cerulli, 2015).   
4.2 Differences-in-differences 
Differences-in-differences (DID) removes bias in the comparison of treated and control units 
that arise from permanent differences between these groups and from time trends unrelated to 
the treatment (Imbens & Wooldridge, 2009). In the DID framework, identification of the ATT 
is accomplished via the parallel trends assumption (PTA). Let 𝑌𝑡=0
1  and 𝑌𝑡=1
1  denote the pre- and 
post-intervention outcomes for the treated and 𝑌𝑡=0
0  and 𝑌𝑡=1
0  denote the pre- and post-
intervention outcomes for the control group. In the potential outcome framework the ATT is 
defined as  
𝐴𝑇𝑇 = 𝐸[𝑌𝑡=1
1 − 𝑌𝑡=1
0 | 𝐷 = 1]  
To find an estimand for the unobservable potential outcome 𝐸[𝑌𝑡=1
0 |𝐷 = 1], the population 
average difference in the control group is subtracted from the population average difference in 
the treated group:  
 𝐴𝑇𝑇 = 𝐴𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐼𝐷 = 𝐸[𝑌𝑡=1
1 − 𝑌𝑡=1
0 − 𝑌𝑡=0
0 + 𝑌𝑡=0
0 | 𝐷 = 1] 
  = 𝐸[𝑌𝑡=1
1 − 𝑌𝑡=0
0 |𝐷 = 1] − 𝐸[𝑌𝑡=1
0 − 𝑌𝑡=0
0 |𝐷 = 1]  
The PTA states that had the treated not been treated, their change over time would have equaled 
to the trend of the non-treated, which yields:  
𝐸[𝑌𝑡=1
1 − 𝑌𝑡=0
0 |𝐷 = 1] = 𝐸[𝑌𝑡=1
0 − 𝑌𝑡=0
0 |𝐷 = 0], 
and can be substituted into ATTDID:   
𝐴𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐼𝐷 = 𝐸[𝑌𝑡=1
1 − 𝑌𝑡=0
0 |𝑋𝑖, 𝐷 = 1] − 𝐸[𝑌𝑡=1
0 − 𝑌𝑡=0
0 |𝑋𝑖, 𝐷 = 0].   
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The ATTDID can then be estimated as  
𝐴𝑇?̂?𝐷𝐼𝐷 = (?̅?𝑡=1
1 − ?̅?𝑡=0
1 ) − (?̅?𝑡=1
0 − ?̅?𝑡=0
0 ) = Δ?̅?1 − Δ?̅?0   
The double differencing removes the bias that results from a common time trend unrelated to 
the intervention as well as from permanent differences between the groups  (Imbens 
& Wooldridge, 2009).  
For the two-wave panel case, efficient and consistent estimation of the ATT if the only 
difference in the expected trajectories of 𝑌0 for both groups is in their levels (their intercepts) 
is possible by estimating 𝛿𝐷𝐼𝐷 in a linear parametric model  
ΔYit = 𝛼𝑡 +  𝛿
𝐷𝐼𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑡 + ΔXit + ΔEi + Δ𝜀𝑖𝑡 
(Imbens & Wooldridge, 2009). First differencing removes the unobserved individual fixed 
effects Ei. The first-difference-model assumes that in the absence of the treatment, any 
difference between mean outcome paths for those in the treated and the control groups remains 
constant over time.3 So if the effect of Ei on the outcome is time invariant, PTA will hold and 
𝛿𝐷𝐼𝐷 will be an unbiased estimator for the ATT. Including covariates results in a conditional 
PTA assumption, meaning a shift of the outcome path is parallel for farms with similar covariate 
values.  
The conditional PTA implies that selection into treatment depends exclusively on an individual 
fixed effect (i.e. permanent differences between the groups), which enters the model additively 
and linearly. That is, for the PTA to hold, unobservable characteristics must be time invariant 
so that they lead to a parallel shift in the outcome variable (Figure 3a). However, if 
environmental preferences or likewise unobserved factors affect treatment selection and are 
correlated with the outcome, self-selection becomes endogenous, which results in a violation 
of the PTA – analogous to the situation in Figure 1d). In this case 𝛿𝐷𝐼𝐷will overestimate the 
true ATT because participants, if they had not participated, would have reduced the harmful 
environmental outcome more than the non-participants (Figure 3b).  
                                                          
3
  The first-difference-model is also referred to as change score analysis. An alternative modelling strategy is to 
regress the outcome on a time dummy and an interaction of the treatment indicator with the time dummy. This 
is referred to as analysis of covariance. Which approach to favor depends on the underlying causal-effect paths; 
for example in case of selection based on the pre-treatment dependent variable, the analysis of covariance is 
preferable but in case of selection on fixed characteristics, the change score analysis is preferable (Allison 
1990).  
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Figure 3:  Average treatment effect from DID  
a)                b)  
 
?̂?𝐷𝐼𝐷  ATT ?̂?
𝐷𝐼𝐷  
 
 
Through the assumption of parallel trends, the first-difference model is consistent for cases a) 
to c) in Figure 1 – as is matching on X the pre-treatment outcome. It cannot include effect paths 
of Figure 1e) because first differencing implicitly controls for the change in X through including 
𝚫Xit in the linear parmetric model. Here, the post-treatment farm characteristics are a mediating 
factor between treatment status and outcome, and part of the change in X over time is caused 
by the treatment itself and controlling for the change in X would lead to overcontrol bias, hence 
underestimation the causal effect.  
4.3 DID-Matching 
DID-Matching (Abadie, 2005; Heckman et al., 1997; Heckman, Ichimura, Smith, & Todd, 
1998; Smith & Todd, 2005) allows for temporally invariant differences in outcomes between 
participants and nonparticipants, that is, an unobserved fixed effect. It is analogous to the 
standard DID regression estimator, without requiring the linear functional form restriction but 
still requires the parallel trends assumption (Smith & Todd, 2005). Thus, DID-Matching allows 
for time variant observed effects and time invariant unobserved effects. 
For DID-Matching, a matched control sample instead of the whole control sample is used to 
estimate the treatment effect via double differencing. The matched control group is similar to 
the treated group in terms of observed pre-treatment characteristics, which makes the PTA more 
plausible. Consequently, the matched controls (MCs) are a better substitute for the potential 
outcome trend than the whole sample (Figure 4a). ?̅?0𝑀𝐶 and ?̅?1𝑀𝐶represent the mean outcomes 
of the matched controls before and after the treatment period. ?̅?01 and ?̅?11 represent the mean 
outcomes the treated farms before and after AES adoption and 𝐸[𝑌10|𝑇 = 1] represents the 
potential outcome trend of the treated. If matching includes all relevant characteristics, the 
treated and matched control units will only differ in their baseline difference in pre-treatment 
outcome levels. The causal effect of participation is then identified by substituting the outcome 
trend of the matched controls (?̅?0𝑀𝐶 − ?̅?1𝑀𝐶) for the unobserved potential outcome of the treated.  
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Figure 4:  DID-Matching (a) and DID-Matching on the pre-treatment outcome (b) 
a)               b)  
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Many studies condition on the pre-treatment outcome, though without theoretical justification 
(Arata & Sckokai, 2016; Pufahl & Weiss, 2009). Chabé-Ferret (2017) shows that there is no 
situation in which DID with conditioning on the pre-treatment outcome is consistent when fixed 
and transitory confounders determine selection.  
Matching on the pre-treatment outcome results in covariate balance (?̅?01 = ?̅?0MC) between 
treatment and matched controls in the pre-treatment period (Figure 4b).  
The matching estimator is  
𝐴𝑇?̂?𝑀 = ?̅?1
1 − ?̅?1
𝑀𝐶, 
and the DID-Matching estimator is  
𝐴𝑇?̂?𝑀_𝐷𝐼𝐷 = (?̅?1
1 − ?̅?0
1) − (?̅?1
𝑀𝐶−?̅?0
𝑀𝐶) 
When matching on the pre-treatment outcome, ?̅?0𝑀𝐶 equals ?̅?01 and 𝐴𝑇?̂?𝑀−𝐷𝐼𝐷 becomes 
equivalent to the matching estimator:  
𝐴𝑇?̂?𝑀_𝐷𝐼𝐷 = (?̅?1
1 − ?̅?0
1) − (?̅?1
𝑀𝐶−?̅?0
1) = ?̅?1
1 − ?̅?1
𝑀𝐶 = 𝐴𝑇?̂?𝑚. 
If matching on the pre-treatment outcome is consistent (inconsistent) then DID-Matching will 
as well be consistent (inconsistent), thus superfluous (Chabé-Ferret, 2014). Therefore, DID-
Matching on the pre-treatment outcome inherits only the properties of matching and not the 
strengths of both approaches.  
Thus, DID-Matching on the pre-treatment outcome can be only consistent in the absence of an 
unobserved fixed confounder, which makes matching suffice. Worse, it is additionally likely to 
introduce bias compared to DID-Matching that does not condition on the pre-treatment 
outcome: in this case, the matched control sample would satisfy the PTA, but conditioning on 
the outcome forces pre-treatment outcomes to be equal on average (?̅?01). This restricts the 
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possible matched control sample to those with an outcome level lower than the average matched 
control sample (which makes DID after matching irrelevant). Unless there is a strong theoretical 
reason for using this subsample to represent the potential outcome, it seems likely that 
conditioning on the pre-treatment outcome introduces a new source of bias. For example, if the 
pre-treatment outcome becomes balanced and farms do not participate although pre-requisites 
for participation could have easily been met, the unobserved factors causing D=0 might be 
associated with a flatter slope as these farms might converge to the long run average factor use 
intensity. In this case, matching and DID-matching on the pre-treatment outcome would 
overestimate the ATT while DID-matching without conditioning on the pre-treatment outcome 
would be unbiased. 
In summary, if selection is determined by an unobserved fixed effect and time varying 
observables, DID-matching is likely to be the least biased estimator for the ATT. However, for 
DID-matching to be consistent, the PTA must still hold for the matched sample. This requires 
that all covariates determining the time trend are observed and become balanced after matching. 
If unobservables have a time variant effect on the outcome, DID-matching still cannot identify 
the causal effect (cf. Figure 1d). Unlike matching and first differencing, DID-matching can 
incorporate the case in Figure 1e as it does not condition on post-treatment characteristics that 
might be moderators on the path between treatment status and outcome. Given the assumed 
possible cause-effect-paths, we illustrate DID-matching. 
5 Illustration: Evaluating AES in Germany  
5.1 Data, sample and AES participation  
For illustration of pro-environmental land use effects of AES programs, we use a large sample 
of farms in West Germany from the EU-FADN in the period 2000-2006.4 We proceed as 
follows: first, we discuss and identify variables X to be included in the matching model. These 
variables are those that influence the participation decision and the outcome variable 
simultaneously (Caliendo & Kopeinig, 2008) and lie along backdoor paths that generate non-
causal association between participation and outcome (Pearl, 2000). We test their influence 
using a standard Logit model. Then we perform DID-matching using the Mahalanobis distance 
based with various matching algorithms (nearest neighbor and kernel density matching with 
optimal bandwidth selection) since which estimator suits best in terms of variance and bias 
reduction depends on the data at hand (Caliendo & Kopeinig, 2008). We then compare achieved 
covariate balances.  
  
                                                          
4
  European Commission, Community Committee for the Farm Accountancy Data Network (FADN), Farm 
Accountancy Data for Germany 1999-2006. 
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We exclude farms specialized in horticulture and permanent crops and organic farms. Organic 
farms have a close to 100% participation rate, and horticulture farms have a very low 
participation rate, which makes it unlikely to find good matches for these farms. Furthermore, 
we exclude vineyards because AES are not primarily targeting vineyards and the vineyard farms 
that have additional cropping or livestock activities probably undergo a different decision-
making than the other farm types, which would result in matches that are different on 
unobservable covariates. We calculate the effect of participation after the usual contract 
duration of five years. To maximize the sample of treated farms, we employ data from the whole 
first budgetary period from 2000 to 2006, accounting for variable starting dates. This allows us 
to use observations from different cohorts of participating farms during the first period with a 
minimum participation length of five years.  
Most of the participating farms in the first period enter the agri-environmental programs in the 
first years from 2000 to 2002 (see appendix Table AI). For the DID analysis, six years of 
observations are necessary: the pre-treatment year plus five years of participation. As controls, 
we use only farms that never participated in AES during this period, meaning that farms that 
switch treatment state are excluded from the analysis. Thus, three cohorts are included in the 
analysis, namely farms with observed pre-participation years 1999, 2000 or 2001 followed by 
five years of continuous participation or non-participation. This yields a sample of 931 treated 
and 1431 untreated farms that can be used for DID estimation.  
The model for AES participation is based on the specifications of Pufahl and Weiss (2009) and 
Arata and Sckokai (2016), and includes all theoretically relevant predictors of participation 
identified by Zimmermann and Britz (2016). The latter find that participation in AES is based 
on how well the schemes requirements can be integrated into the production program of the 
farm. This leads to two groups of variables that affect the participation decision: the production 
portfolio represented by farm type, livestock densities and cropping shares, and the farm 
characteristics, such as size, share of rented land and grassland, region, capital intensity and 
productivity. As indicators for pro-environmental outcomes, we consider fertilizer and plant 
protection expenditures as well as grassland share.  
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Table I:  Means of farm characteristics by treatment state and cohort 
 Cohort  
 2000 2001 2002 
Participation No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Outcomes (5 years difference)       
Diff. in fertilizer exp. (€/ha) 11.18 5.27 -0.76 -3.88 9.87 -5.87 
Diff. in plant protection exp. (€/ha) 3.09 -3.86 -0.23  0.91 9.55  -1.83 
Diff. in grassland share (%-points) -0.01  0.00 -0.02  0.00 -0.02  0.00 
Farm characteristics (pre-participation)  
Age of farmer 45 45 45 45 45 47 
Land input (ha) 60 54 65 80 64 59 
Share of grassland area 0.38 0.39 0.37 0.3 0.34 0.31 
Share of rented land 0.50 0.57 0.51 0.63 0.52 0.58 
Share of cereals area 0.32 0.34 0.34 0.43 0.36 0.38 
Cattle (LU/ha) 1.11 0.94 1.08 0.68 1.07 0.97 
Pigs and poultry (LU) per ha 1.01 0.65 1.00 0.76 1.08 0.90 
Sales per hectare (1000€) 2.79 2.45 3.04 2.43 3.50 2.85 
Revenue per working unit 91 64 99 88 102 85 
Revenue per capital 0.51 0.29 0.61 0.49 0.47 0.30 
Fixed capital per hectare (1000€) 13.32 13.85 13.41 10.99 13.64 13.36 
Fertilizer expenditure per hectare 88 74 104 88 113 108 
Plant protection expenditure per hectare  69 70 73 79 82 83 
Direct payments crops per hectare 161 171 166 214 172 197 
Direct payments livestock per hectare 30 17 50 33 81 67 
LFA participation (0/1)=1 0.00 0.00 0.12 0.47 0.13 0.42 
Farm type       
  Crop  0.22 0.19 0.25 0.30 0.27 0.29 
  Livestock 0.50 0.46 0.48 0.32 0.48 0.44 
  Livestock crop mixed 0.28 0.34 0.27 0.37 0.26 0.27 
Region       
  South 0.06 0.80 0.06 0.25 0.09 0.58 
  West 0.18 0.17 0.21 0.63 0.21 0.25 
  North 0.76 0.03 0.73 0.12 0.70 0.17 
Participation in AES bef. 2000 0.08 0.94 0.07 0.44 0.08 0.48 
N 458 740 497 139 482 52 
Source: FADN  
 
The mean and standard deviation of the outcome indicators and the farm characteristics are 
presented in Table I by participating and non-participating farms and by the three cohorts. The 
first rows present the outcome variables in terms of five years difference. For example, in the 
2000 cohort the difference in fertilizer expenditure for non-participants is 11.18 €/ha and for 
participants it is 5.27 €/ha, resulting in a naïve DID estimate of -5.91 €/ha. At a base value for 
the treated of 74.41 €/ha before treatment, this amounts to a decrease by 7.9% in fertilizer 
expenditure in the first cohort. There is considerable variation across cohorts as the 2001 and 
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2002 cohorts have naïve DID estimates of -3.5% and -14.5%. The variation is even larger for 
plant protection expenditures where these estimates vary from -13.7% to +1.5%.  
Participating farms have a larger share of rented land, less livestock density, lower sales per 
hectare, lower work and capital productivity and less fertilizer expenditures. Therefore, AES 
farms are characterized by a lower production intensity as the non-AES farms. Additionally, 
AES participation occurs much more in the south than in the north and participating farms also 
receive least favored area (LFA) payments.   
In order to test the relevance of the farm characteristics for the participation decision, we use a 
logit model (Table II). Associated with AES uptake are share of rented land, cattle density, farm 
type, region and, for those farms with AES uptake in 2000, participation in environmental 
programs before 2000.  
Table II:  Coefficients of logit model for AES uptake by participation cohort  
AES Participation (0/1) Entry year 
 2000 2001 2002 
Age of farmer 1.00 (0.01) 1.00 (0.00) 1.00 (0.01) 
Land input (10 ha) 1.02 (0.02) 1.01 (0.01) 1.03* (0.02) 
Share of grassland area 0.68 (0.33) 1.43 (0.46) 0.61 (0.25) 
Share of rented land 2.49*** (0.75) 1.62** (0.31) 1.40 (0.38) 
Share of cereals area 0.37* (0.20) 0.99 (0.34) 0.16*** (0.07) 
Cattle (LU/ha) 0.72** (0.11) 0.73*** (0.08) 0.77** (0.10) 
Pigs and poultry (LU) per ha 1.15* (0.09) 0.90*** (0.04) 1.02 (0.05) 
Sales per hectare  0.99** (0.01) 1.00 (0.00) 0.99 (0.01) 
Revenue per working unit (10€) 1.00 (0.02) 1.00 (0.01) 0.99 (0.01) 
Revenue per capital (10€) 0.89 (0.11) 0.89** (0.05) 0.99 (0.03) 
Fixed capital (100€/ha)  1.00 (0.00) 1.00 (0.00) 1.00* (0.00) 
Fertilizer expend. (10€/ha) 1.00 (0.01) 0.97*** (0.01) 0.99 (0.01) 
Plant protection expend. (10€/ha) 0.99 (0.01) 1.01 (0.01) 1.00 (0.01) 
Direct payments crops (10€/ha) 0.97*** (0.01) 1.03*** (0.01) 1.05*** (0.01) 
Direct payments livestock (10€/ha) 0.97*** (0.01) 0.99 (0.00) 0.99* (0.00) 
LFA participation (0/1)=1 1.68*** (0.24) 1.06 (0.12) 1.16 (0.17) 
Farm type (Base=Crop)       
Livestock 0.89 (0.23) 0.96 (0.18) 1.25 (0.27) 
Livestock crop mixed 1.36 (0.26) 1.33** (0.18) 1.55** (0.28) 
Region (Base=South)       
West 0.04*** (0.01) 0.84 (0.11) 0.72** (0.12) 
North 0.03*** (0.01) 0.18*** (0.03) 0.20*** (0.04) 
Participation bef. 2000       
Yes  23.71*** (3.77) 1.26* (0.15) 1.06 (0.17) 
unknown 8.97*** (1.71) 1.37*** (0.16) 2.85*** (0.35) 
Pseudo R2   0.615  0.155    0.155  
Observations  4212   3212   2296  
Coefficients given as odds ratios, standard errors in parenthesis, * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, cross-sectional 
data at year of participation  
Source: FADN  
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5.2  Average treatment effects of AES participation  
We calculate the DID-matching estimator using nearest neighbor matching on Mahalanobis 
distance and kernel matching (Heckman, Ichimura, Smith et al., 1998; Heckman, Ichimura, & 
Todd, 1998) with optimal bandwidth selection (Galdo et al., 2008; Huber et al., 2015; Loader, 
1999). Exact matching is imposed on year, region and farm type: treated farms can have their 
first participation in any year and must be matched to a control farm in the same cohort. Region 
is an important predictor of participation and captures otherwise unobserved climatic and 
structural effects that can influence the outcome. Farm specialization also seems a very 
important predictor for participation and different farm types undergo different decision-
making, therefore matching farm types seems important for deriving a causal effect. We also 
match exactly on the quartiles of cattle density as otherwise balance on cattle gets worse after 
matching.5 Furthermore, we do not match on the respective pre-treatment outcomes, which are 
fertilizer expenditures, plant protection expenditures and share of grassland, respectively.  
We first calculate the average treatment effects for the treated for the outcome of fertilizer 
expenditure (Table III).6 We additionally provide bias-corrected matching estimators where the 
difference within the matched groups is regression-adjusted for the difference in covariate 
values (Abadie & Imbens, 2006, 2011). This amounts to understanding the forming of matched 
samples as a preparatory data processing for a more robust parametric analysis (Ho et al., 2007). 
The matching algorithms differ in the resulting number of observations that are used for the 
calculation. For example, the 1:1 NN Mahalanobis matching uses only 182 of 1411 possible 
control observations. Similarly, the kernel matching with optimized bandwidth selection based 
on cross validation with respect to the explanatory variables uses only 83 treated and 121 
control observations. The other kernel matching methods use decisively more observations.  
The nearest neighbor estimators that use a fixed number of matched controls (one and five) do 
not yield significant results. The kernel methods that do not excessively prune observations 
(quantile distribution method and weighted cross validation) yield insignificant estimates as 
well. When comparing covariate balance across matching variants (see details below), it stands 
out that the cross validation kernel method is the only method that balances the indicator of 
participation in environmental programs before 2000. As all other covariates have similar 
balance, it might be that the balance on this item, which is also a significant predictor of 
participation, causes the larger point estimator. 
                                                          
5
  For the NN-matching on fixed number of matches, we match on the quartiles of cattle density instead but do 
not enforce exact matching as otherwise the minimum number of pairs for correct standard error estimation 
cannot be reached.   
6
  Kernel matching estimators were calculated with the Stata user written program kmatch (Jann, 2017).  
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Table III: DID-matching outcomes for fertilizer expenditures  
    Regression-adjustede)  
Matching 
estimator 
Matched 
treated 
Matched 
controls 
ATT in 
€/ha (s.e.) 
95% CI 
ATT in €/ha 
(s.e.) 
95% CI 
NN mahalanobis matching   
1:1 NN 
mahalanobis 
matching  
924 182 
-0.43 
(7.01)c) 
[-14.3; 7.8] 
-8.82 
(7.11) c) 
[-22.7; 5.1] 
1:5 NN 
mahalanobis 
matching   
923 450 
-3.21 
(5.66) c) 
[-14.3; 7.8] 
-10.92* 
(5.95) c) 
[-22.5; 0.7] 
Kernel matching bandwidth selection method   
R∗quant-dist. 
Method a)  
764 1198 
-2.29 
(5.36) d) 
[-12.8; 8.2] 
-14.72* 
(8.85) d) 
[-32.1; 2.6] 
Cross 
validation  
83 121 
-10.50  
(8.70) d) 
[-27.6; 6.5] -14.37 (10.7) d) [-35.3; 6.7] 
Weighted cross 
validation b)  
729 1069 
-4.31 
(5.00) d) 
[-14.1; 5.5] -12.45 (8.63) d) [-29.4; 4.5] 
N   924 1411   924 1411 
Notes: exact matching on year, farm type, region and quartiles of cattle density, * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
a) 1.5*90% quantile, Huber et al. 2015 b) Galdo et al. 2008 c) Abadie and Imbens (2008) standard erros   
d) standard errors bootstrapped with 1000 replications e) Abadie and Imbens (2011) 
 
As we cannot achieve balance on this predictor at reasonable sample sizes, we present 
regression adjusted estimators (Table III, right columns), for which remaining covariate 
imbalance within the matches is regression-adjusted for the difference in covariate values 
(Abadie & Imbens, 2011). The post matching regression adjustment suggest larger point 
estimators that are closer to the cross validation that achieves balances the pre-2000 
environmental program participation. This suggests that balance in this covariate increases the 
impact of participation. However, only the quantile distribution method yields a weakly 
significant effect of -14.7 €/ha change in fertilizer expenditure. Given an average pre-
participation expenditure of 78.4 €/ha this amounts to a reduction of about 19%.   
To evaluate the matching procedures, we compare standardized bias before and after matching 
(Figure 5). Unlike t-tests, the standardized bias is not influenced by sample size, which can distort 
the results, as the pre-matching sample is usually much larger than the matched sample. 
Additionally the t-test does not reveal if balance on a confounder in fact increased after matching.7 
Guidelines for what constitutes an acceptable standardized bias of a given covariate lie between 
0.1 and 0.25, depending on the context (Harder, Stuart, & Anthony, 2010). For the farm 
characteristics in this study, a standardized difference of below 25% is considered acceptable. 
                                                          
7
  For more arguments against t-tests to assess balance before and after matching see Imai, King, and Stuart 
(2008).  
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Figure 5: Covariate balance before and after matching (outcome fertilizer expenditure)  
 
Notes: matching on covariates listed, combined with exact matching on year, farm type, region and the quartiles 
of cattle density; imbalance in participation in environmental programes not depicted, its standardized difference 
reduces from 2.4 to around 1.5 in these matching variants. 
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Covariate balance in terms of standardized bias generally improves after matching but remains 
larger than 25% for farm characteristics like size, share of rented land, fixed capital and pre-
2000 experience with environmental programs. Although the matching estimates differ 
considerably in terms of used observations and significance levels of effects, achieved covariate 
balance is comparable. Therefore, we favor the kernel methods as they use observations more 
efficiently without increasing imbalance. The remaining imbalance on share of rented land 
seems problematic because share of rented land is an important predictor of participation (cf. 
Table II). Therefore, matching is repeated for the kernel methods forcing more balance on this 
covariate by exact matching on the quartiles of rented land shares. The exact matching on share 
of rented land matching improves balance drastically for both kernel matching variants (Figure 
6).   
Figure 6: Improved covariate balance (added exact matching on share of rented land) 
 
Notes: matching on covariates listed, combined with exact matching on year, farm type, region and the quartiles 
of cattle density and share of rented land; imbalance in participation in environmental programes not depicted, 
standardized difference reduces from 2.4 to around 1.5 in these matching variants. 
 
The improvement in covariate bias decreases the number of treated units used for matching and 
the effect sizes increase (Table IV). The estimands from both kernel matching techniques 
become very similar and differ only in the second decimal place of the standard error. The 
regression adjusted estimands are significant (p<0.05) and amount to a reduction of about 20%.  
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Next, we turn to the effect of AES participation on the change in share of grassland. Confidence 
intervals of the effect sizes in an increase in grassland range from zero to five percentage points. 
Covariate balance is similar to matching with regard to the outcome fertilizer expenditures 
(Figure A1). None of the matching algorithms yields significant effects for the reduction in 
plant protection expenditures.8 Therefore, we cannot reject that there is no impact of AES 
participation on plant protection measures. 
Table IV:  DID-matching outcomes for fertilizer expenditures, reduced imbalance  
    Regression-adjustedd)  
Kernel matching  
Matched 
treated 
Matched 
controls 
ATT   
(s.e.) 
95% CI 
ATT 
(s.e.) 
95% CI 
Outcome: Fertilizer expenditurese)   
R∗quant-dist. 
Method a)  
543 607 
-5.93  
(4.83) c) 
[-15.4; 3.5] 
-16.41**  
(6.76) c) 
[-29.7; -3.1] 
Weighted cross 
validation b)  
543 607 
-5.93  
(4.91) c) 
[-15.5; 3.7] 
-16.41**  
(6.74) c) 
[-29.6; -3.2] 
Outcome: Change in share of grasslandf)    
R∗quant-dist. 
Method a)  
543 611 
0.03*** 
(0.009) c) 
[.01; .05] 
0.02*   
(0.012) c) 
[-.001; .05] 
Weighted cross 
validation b)  
557 625 
0.03***  
(0.007) c) 
[.01; .04] 
0.02** 
(0.011) c) 
[.001; .04] 
N   924 1411   924 1411 
Notes: exact matching on year, farm type, region, quartiles of cattle density and share of rented land, * p < 0.1,  
** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 a) using 1.5*90% quantile, Huber et al. 2015 b) Galdo et al. 2008 c) standard errors 
bootstrapped with 1000 replications d) Abadie and Imbens (2011) e) outcome in €/ha f) outcome in percentage 
points; 
 
5.3 Average treatment effects of AES participation by farm types   
We investigate the AES impacts by farm type and consider specialized crop farms, livestock 
farms but also mixed farms defined based on the FADN typology (TF8). We cannot find any 
significant effects of AES on input intensity and grassland share for crop farms. For livestock 
farms, we find different effect patterns than in the pooled sample (cf. Table V). The effect on 
fertilizer expenditures is as expected negative but non-significant and the reduction in plant 
protection measures is significant. Changes in shares of grassland are with around five to six 
percentage points slightly larger than in the pooled sample.  
Covariate balance measured in standardized bias lies within the bounds of 0.25 (for brevity see 
appendix Figure A2). This was achieved by additionally forcing exact matches on the deciles 
of the distribution of livestock density and quartiles of the rented land share. Covariate bias is 
                                                          
8
  Results can be made available upon request. 
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better in the weighted cross validation. The reduction in plant protection expenditures of -9 €/ha 
can be related to average pre-treatment expenditure of 72.4 €/ha which results in a 12% 
reduction.   
The analysis for mixed farms showed that matching did not result in acceptable covariate 
balance. Thus, treatment effects for the subgroup of mixed farms were not derived and we 
conclude that environmental impacts mainly originate from AES participation of livestock 
farms for changes in grassland share and reduction in plant protection measures. The fact that 
we do not find a reduction in fertilizer reduction in any of the subgroups but in the pooled 
sample might be due to sample size reduction in the subgroup specific analysis. Overall, the 
results for the livestock farms seem robust, as the covariate balance is much better than in 
pooled sample and the effects on plant protection and grassland share are larger and statistically 
significant, though sample size is about a third than that of the pooled sample.  
Table V:  DID-matching outcomes for livestock farms 
 N matched   Regresion-adjustedc) 
Kernel 
matching  
Treated Control 
ATT  
(s.e.)  
95% CI 
ATT  
(s.e.) 
95% CI 
Outcome: Fertilizer expendituresd)   
R∗quant-dist. 
Method a)  
177 240 
-10.3* 
(5.81) 
[-21.7; 1.1] -10.2 (8.27) [-26.5; 5.9] 
Weighted 
cross 
validation b)  
169 204 
-10.6* 
(6.13) 
[-22.6; 1.4] -11.1 (10.18) [-31.1; 8.8] 
Outcome: Plant protection measure expendituresd)    
R∗quant-dist. 
Method a)  
179 241 
-6.8  
(4.53) 
[-15.7; 2.1] 
-6.7*  
(3.88) 
[-14.3; 0.9] 
Weighted 
cross 
validation b)  
170 205 -7.1 (4.9) [-16.7; 2.5] 
-9.0**  
(4.24) 
[-17.3; -0.7] 
Outcome: Change in share of grasslande)    
R∗quant-dist. 
Method a)  
178 242 
0.03*  
(0.015) 
[-.001; .06] 
0.05** 
(0.021) 
[.001; .09] 
Weighted 
cross 
validation b)  
168 197 
0.03**  
(0.017) 
[ .01; .09] 
0.06**  
(0.028) 
[ .001; .11] 
N   411 691   411 691 
Notes: exact matching on year, region, deciles of cattle density and quartiles of share of rented land, * p < 0.1, 
** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, standard errors bootstrapped with 1000 replications a) using 1.5*90% quantile, Huber 
et al. 2015 b) Galdo et al. 2008 c) Abadie ad Imbens (2011) d) outcome in €/ha e) outcome in percentage points; 
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6  Discussion, future research and policy implications 
This paper was motivated by the fact that policy impact evaluation relies far too less on unbiased 
causal effect estimation. This is traced back to the two fundamental obstacles for causal impact 
evaluation: the non-experimental conditions and lack of data. We address both of these issues 
within our study. To approach the problem of deriving causal estimates from non-experimental 
situations, a natural starting point is to gain understanding of the self-selection mechanism of 
farmers into the programs. Thus, we base our analysis on alternative cause-and-effect paths. 
These offer the advantage of revealing where the knowledge base on how unobserved site-
effects and unobservable farmer characteristics enter the impact pathway of AES participation 
on the environmental outcome is deficient. Furthermore, relying on cause-and-effect paths in 
causal inference enhances understanding about the validity of assumptions for causal effect 
identification and allows assessing the consequences of possible deviations from the theorized 
treatment assignment mechanism, which in turn fosters discussion about the plausibility of 
results.  
Based on clarified assumptions for treatment effect identification, we illustrate DID-estimators 
combined with several matching algorithms including kernel matching with optimal bandwidth 
selection and post-matching regression adjustment. We estimate causal impacts of AES 
participation on sustainably of land use in West Germany. To be able to retain a sample size 
that is sufficient for DID-estimation, we used three cohorts of farms from the first 
implementation period of the new CAP period of 2000-2006. This is unique in the agricultural 
evaluation context and enables us to provide meaningful casual effects also by farm types. We 
match on Mahalanobis distances combined with exact matching on the pre-participation year. 
The outlined procedure serves as an illustrative case study for evaluation of AES and can easily 
be transferred to other European countries and programming periods in order to enhance 
understanding of the impact of agri-environmental measures.  
We address the second major obstacle of policy impact analysis – lack of data – by showing 
that with a sophisticated data strategy, the FADN is in general a sufficiently large database, 
providing a representative set of panel observations that is large enough to perform this very 
data-demanding quasi-experimental analysis. To enhance understanding of the robustness of 
our results, we closely tracked standardized bias in covariates and sample sizes. This iterative 
procedure of assigning more importance to unbalanced covariates in order to force more 
balancing in this covariate at the cost of pruning observations worked well in this application. 
This, however, might be the exception rather than the rule. New procedures integrate these steps 
of bias minimization and sample size trade-off (King, Lucas, & Nielsen, 2017) and might offer 
valuable solutions for FADN-like datasets as well. Together with more suitable outcome 
indicators, such as nutrient balances, these methods seem promising to put causal agri-
environmental policy evaluation into common practice.  
Based on the explicit theoretical framework of cause and effect paths of AES participation and 
exploring its consequences for empirical analysis, we offer an informed understanding about 
future research needs: The cause-and-effect paths reveal the adoption decision as they point to 
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consider in the kind of relationships that form the basis of quasi-experimental impact 
evaluation. Past adoption studies employ a diversity of theoretical framings, which makes 
synthesis across cases difficult (Yoder et al., 2019). This limits the usefulness of the variety of 
studies to inform policy impact analysis. Facilitating future research, our findings highlight the 
role of environmental preferences of the farm manager but also risk behavior in decision-
making, and how institutional factors such as social norms and rules influence the participation 
decision of farmers will be relevant. Closing this knowledge gap could yield important insights 
into how quasi-experimental methods within substantiated evaluation frameworks can improve 
agricultural policy analysis and thus design.  
Our results also have relevance at the policy level: we provide tangible estimates for the 
contribution of CAP-measures to the environmental performance of the agricultural sector. Our 
results suggest positive environmental impacts of AES participation. Especially for livestock 
farms, we find a notable increase in grassland shares and reduction in plant protection 
expenditure. Thus, we have demonstrated that it is possible to assess the impact of environ-
mental schemes and compare their efficacy within existing farm data networks. This could be 
of further relevance for the upcoming new delivery model for the post 2020 program period, 
which increases the necessity of large-scale impact evaluation. In order to make large-scale 
impact evaluation more meaningful, the FADN should be enhanced with more direct 
environmental indicators as the expenditures on fertilizers and plant protection are only very 
indirect environmental indicators. Combining FADN with IACS and/or with LPIS data offers 
promising future paths to improve the assessment environmental sustainability. In addition, 
information about AES should be more detailed. For example within the FADN, it is not 
possible to differentiate between AES measures. It could be helpful to analyze the impact of 
each measure and compare their efficacy to gain a better understanding of single AES measures.  
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Appendix  
Table AI: AES uptake by year in West German 
 Number of farms  Number of farms with six years of 
observations  
Year Non-participants Participants 
entering AES 
 Non-participants 
(no switchers) 
Participants  
1999 4,216 –  458 740 
2000 2,769 1,482  491 139 
2001 1,676 1,562  482 52 
2002 1,643 677  – – 
2003 1,651 441  – – 
2004 1,567 397  – – 
2005 2,502 243  – – 
2006 2,636 414  – – 
Source: FADN   
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Figure A1:  Covariate balance for outcome grassland share  
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Figure A2:  Covariate balance for livestock farms 
 
Notes: matching on covariates listed, combined with exact matching on year, region, deciles of cattle density and 
quartiles of rented land share.  
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